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Abstract
The World Trade Organization (WTO) (formerly GATT) was established pri-
marily to achieve free trade across the globe based on the principle of non-dis-
crimination and the process of multilateral trade negotiations. The fact that most 
countries are members of WTO reflects the worldwide belief in the benefits of a 
global free trade. Despite its achievements since the first round of multilateral 
trade negotiations was held, the effectiveness of the process has been called 
into question. Most WTO members are now proposing new regional trading 
arrangements (RTAs), such as free trade agreements (FTAs). 
What implication does these RTAs have for the WTO and ASEAN countries? 
Should ASEAN countries give regionalism priority over the WTO-based mul-
tilateral approach? To answer this questions, this paper will first summarize 
the motivations behind the formation of RTAs before presenting the merits and 
demerits of RTAs as an approach to achieve universal free trade and maximize 
developing countries' welfare. It is argued that despite its inherent limitations 
it is important for ASEAN countries to remain primarily committed to the 
principles of WTO and the process of multilateral trade negotiations.* 
Why Regional Trading Arrangements (RTAs)?
There has been a plethora of proposals for new bilateral and regional 
trade arrangements in recent years. From bilateral agreements such 
as Singapore-US, Singapore-India, Japan-Korea, Japan-Singapore to 
regional ones such as ASEAN-China, ASEAN-India, ASEAN+3 and 
other regional groupings. Up until recently, these countries have only 
opted for a multilateral and non-preferential route to trade liberalization. 
Under this approach these countries undertook unilateral liberalization 
on an MFN basis. However, since the late 1990s there has been a shift 
from the non-preferential route to trade liberalization. Although few of 
these proposals have reached negotiation stage or been formalized, it is 
evident that many economies in the region are seriously engaged in the 
development of new preferential trading relationships, while others are 
actively considering moves in this direction. This includes economies 
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which were in the past staunchly against the preferential route to trade 
liberalization, such as Japan and Korea. 
These initiatives have come in the wake of a global trend towards 
regionalism. As a result, most industrial and developing countries in 
the world are members of a regional trade or integration agreement, 
and many belong to more than one such agreement. More than one 
third of world trade takes place within such agreements and if Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a somewhat looser organization 
comprised of more than twenty high-income, middle-income, and low-
income countries of the Pacific Basin, is included, this figure increases 
to 59 percent (World Bank 2000: 1). 
Although all RTAs are committed to trade liberalization between the 
members by reducing barriers, they vary in terms of the level of integra-
tion. At the base is the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), where trade barri-
ers (usually tariffs) between partner countries are abolished. However, 
each member independently determines its own external trade barrier 
with non-FTA members. A prominent example of an FTA is the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between US, Canada, and 
Mexico. The next level of integration is the Customs Union where a 
common external trade policy is adopted by member countries (e.g., 
MERCOSUR comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay). 
Common Markets like the European Community adopt further provi-
sions to facilitate free movement of factors of production and harmoni-
zation of trading and production standards across member countries. 
Finally, Economic Unions such as the European Union extend the har-
monization to macroeconomic (such as fiscal and monetary) and social 
as well as legal policies.
There are a number of reasons for this global trend towards regionalism. 
Despite the substantial tariff reduction on manufactured goods resulting 
from the WTO-sponsored trade negotiations, there has been a growing 
dissatisfaction over the multilateral approach to trade liberalization under 
the auspices of the WTO (formerly GATT) for a number of reasons. New 
forms of trade restrictions such as the Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs), 
Orderly Marketing Arrangements (OMAs), technical standards, customs 
procedures and others have emerged as disguised forms of protectionism. 
The large membership of the WTO has made negotiations more compli-
cated and difficult to resolve, let alone monitor compliances. The Western 
countries, particularly Western Europe and the US, are increasingly disil-
lusioned with the slow progress in trade liberalization, and there has been 
a growing perception that multilateralism has failed to provide a level 
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playing field. The Special and Differential treatment (S & D) accorded to 
developing countries in the form of the Generalized System of Preferences 
has been cited as an example. 
There has been a perception that the European market is becoming 
more inward-looking with the establishment of the European Union (EU) 
and the extension of integration to the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) 
and Eastern European countries. The decline in US economic dominance 
and increased competition from Europe and Japan has reduced US com-
mitment to multilateralism and pushed it to form a countervailing bloc. 
The US-Canada Free Trade Area (FTA) was later followed by the North 
America Free Trade Area (NAFTA). The enterprise for the Americas' ini-
tiative envisages more FTAs with South American countries.
The collapse of the WTO talks in Seattle and recently in Cancun has 
made countries even more pessimistic about the effectiveness of multilat-
eralism and has driven a number of countries to form regional groupings 
as an insurance policy. Singapore Trade Minister George Yeo, who was 
in Cancun for the failed WTO talks said on his return to Singapore that 
Singapore would seek more bilateral free trade agreements following 
the breakdown of Cancun (The Business Times, 23 September 2003). 
He highlighted the importance to Singapore of already signed FTAs 
with New Zealand, Japan, the EFTA and Australia. He said Singapore 
intended to sign similar deals with Canada, India, Chile, Jordan and 
South Korea. Bob Zoellick, America's top trade negotiator, claimed that 
countries were approaching him to push for bilateral deals even as the 
Cancun meeting was crumbling (The Economist, 18 September 2003).
More countries may now divert their negotiating energies into bi-
lateral FTAs. After the failure of the Cancun talks, Mr Zoellick said 
that America would now push on the bilateral and regional route. The 
United States undoubtedly will push ahead and start new FTA talks 
with Colombia and Thailand (and maybe Peru and Sri Lanka). These 
talks were being considered before Cancun, but will be given greater 
priority. Efforts to deepen North American economic integration, in 
part for security, could also advance. However, negotiation of the Free-
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which requires a convergence of 
American and Brazilian positions and which is linked substantially to 
the Doha round, could be set back.1  
The EU will probably give more attention to problems of enlarge-
ment and trade initiatives with Eastern European and Mediterranean 
countries. The EU also may drop its self-imposed moratorium on new 
FTA negotiations in order to keep pace with America. Given European 
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sensitivities on agriculture, however, there is a big risk that such new 
initiatives could focus primarily on manufacturing trade and investment, 
leaving protection for most farm products untouched. But cutting out 
agriculture means that the stalled EU negotiations with the Mercosur 
countries – which have proceeded in parallel with the FTAA – may well 
continue to drift.2
In Asia, countries have engaged more aggressively in negotiating 
FTAs. China is negotiating an FTA with ASEAN, which Japan and In-
dia are trying to emulate. Long-delayed trade talks between Japan and 
South Korea have just been announced. Both are also pursuing other 
FTAs, though agriculture remains a stumbling block. However, if China 
proposes moving forward with a North East Asia FTA, it will be hard 
for South Korea and Japan to resist. For now, an FTA involving East 
Asia's 'big three' is a long-term vision, not a negotiating initiative – but 
that could change quickly if the WTO process remains stalled.
Finally, the faltering support of the US and Western Europe for the mul-
tilateral system has created a sense elsewhere that regionalism is the order 
of the day. Smaller countries are seeking RTAs with their large neighbours. 
Ex-President of Mexico Salinas pushed Mexico into NAFTA because of 
concern that European investments would be diverted to Eastern Europe 
and that domestic reforms in Mexico might be derailed under political 
pressure. On the other hand, there was the US concern with cross-border 
problems should the Mexican economy collapse. 
Due to the above sources of dissatisfaction over WTO-sponsored mul-
tilateral approach, there has been a proliferation of regional trading pacts. 
According to the WTO report (1995), 109 RTAs were submitted to GATT 
between 1947 and 1994. There were 33 registered pacts between 1990 and 
1994. The formation of RTAs worldwide gathered momentum in the 
past decade. For example, of the total 194 agreements recorded with 
the WTO at the beginning of 1999, 87 came into existence since 1990 
(World Bank 2000: 1). Of some 200 RTAs notified to WTO (or GATT) 
so far, more than 130 agreements are still in force today. 
Stumbling or Building Blocks?
The question of whether the proliferation of RTAs will lead to global 
free trade as advocated by the WTO is a relevant but a difficult issue to 
resolve owing to the co-existence of positive and negative implications 
of preferential trading arrangements.3 
That global free trade is more beneficial to countries than regional free 
trade was advocated by Adam Smith and David Ricardo and later was 
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rigorously proved in a number of theoretical studies (for example, Samu-
elson 1939 and Kemp 1962). Viner's analysis of trade creation and trade 
diversion has also shown that preferential trading arrangements are not 
necessarily welfare-enhancing, either from the members' viewpoint or 
from the world's. Preferential trading arrangements are second best 
solutions, as shown by Meade (1955, 1956), Johnson (1958) and others. 
The key issue, therefore, in the light of the trend towards regional-
ism is whether RTAs will reinforce the multilateral free trade system 
and therefore should be welcomed, or whether they will undermine 
the system and deserve condemnation. Should regionalism be given 
priority by developing countries in view of the slow progress of the 
WTO-based multilateral approach?
RTAs as Building Blocks
Critics of the WTO-based multilateral approach to free trade who are 
frustrated with the slow progress made under the WTO in trade liber-
alization have translated the GATT acronym as a General Agreement to 
Talk and Talk. They have argued that RTAs among like-minded nations 
produce faster agreements on trade liberalization. It is suggested that 
certain disciplines must be observed to minimize the incidence of trade 
diversion . For example, that the common external tariff in a CU is not 
higher or more restrictive than the pre-CU level, that duties and regula-
tions in an FTA are not higher than the pre-FTA level, and that greater 
discipline is exercised with regard to anti-dumping and VER actions.
Under the dynamic view of regionalism as a building block for mul-
tilateralism, the threat of regionalism could produce multilateral trade 
agreements that otherwise would have been held up. It was reported 
that one of the forces that prompted the eventual successful conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round in 1993 was the decision of the EU to form a Sin-
gle Common Market in 1992. Thus, there could be a positive interaction 
between regional and global approach to trade liberalization. 
In a political economy sense, negotiations and agreements where few 
parties are involved are easier to achieve than in situations where  many 
parties are involved. There are over a hundred countries currently in-
volved in the process of multilateral trade negotiation, which makes the 
achievement of agreements and resolutions under the Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) principle much more complex and difficult than if ne-
gotiations are conducted with few parties under regional reciprocity. 
The free rider problem has constrained groups of countries to extend 
preferential arrangements under the MFN principle. 
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Further, public support for a RTA tends to be more focused and 
mobilised than support for multilateralism. The politics of preferential 
trade arrangements implies that it is easier for businessmen to secure 
trade diversionary deals in a Free Trade Area or Customs Union than 
in the non-discriminatory world of GATT. 
RTAs as Stumbling Blocks
On the other hand, supporters of the WTO approach have pointed to 
the slow implementation of an FTA or CU. For example, the European 
Community  started in 1957 and the integration process has been slow. 
It took ASEAN ten years after its formation to draw up its agenda for 
economic cooperation, and 25 years to agree to establish an FTA. The 
ASEAN FTA immediately faced hitches in implementation and the time 
frame for implementation was reduced from 15 to  ten years largely 
because the implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements would 
be completed within a ten-year time-frame.
 RTA is designed to promote trade among its members at the expense 
of non-members. It therefore produces a trade-creating effect (gener-
ating trade with one more efficient member at the expense of another 
less efficient member) and a trade-diverting effect (taking trade away 
from efficient outside suppliers and giving it to inefficient member 
countries). Which effect would be dominant depends on the propor-
tion of trade between members and non-members, on the expenditure 
share between imports and domestic production and on the elasticity 
of substitution between goods. It is not certain that the trade diversion 
effect is minimized if the regional trade arrangement is confined to 
proximate countries.4
Regionalism could also undermine multilateralism within the dy-
namic context. The unwillingness of the EC to start the multilateral 
trade negotiations in 1982 and its foot-dragging in the Uruguay Round 
reflect to some extent its availability of regionalism as an option. Under 
this scenario the world will be divided into three or two trading blocs. 
So far, RTAs have been positive forces in driving global liberaliza-
tion with initiatives to establish free trade between regional groupings. 
This goal of global free trade is quite feasible. As Table 1 shows, over 
60 percent of world trade now occurs within regional groupings that 
have already achieved free trade such as the EU and Australia-New 
Zealand, or have signed an agreement  to achieve it such as NAFTA 
and AFTA, or have made a political commitment to do so by a certain 
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date, such APEC, the Free Trade of the Americas and EUROMED. On 
the other hand, the proliferation of regional arrangements could also 
make it difficult to maintain consistency with the global system. For 
example, the next potential regional arrangement, a Trans Atlantic 
Free Trade Area (TAFTA) between North America and Europe, could 
have a negative impact on the global trading system by encompassing 
new discrimination against the poor by the rich and thus reversing the 
progress towards North-South trade cooperation.
    
TABLE 1:  Regional Free Trade Arrangements (Share of World Trade, 
1994)a
         
              
Notes:  
a Trade among the members of each regional group.
b Excluding trade among the members of their own sub-regional groups.
Source: Bergsten (1996).  
Critical Factors for Making RTAs Building Blocks
Given that there are positive as well as negative implications of RTAs 
for achieving global free trade, it is not certain how RTAs can contribute 
to achieving the goal of the WTO. 
Arguably, whether regionalism will lead to a fragmented world 
economy or to non-discriminatory free trade through building blocks 
depends on the willingness of member governments, the behaviour of 
interest groups, the reactions of governments and interest groups in 
non-member countries and the types of rules of accession adopted.   
RTAs can become building blocks if they are open to everyone and 
if everyone who wants to join  is admitted on the same terms as the 
original members. RTAs can also become building blocks through 
mergers of blocks. This situation occurs when each economy forms a 
European Union 22.8%
EUROMED 2.3%
NAFTA 7.9%
Mercosur 0.3%
Free Trade Area of the Americas 2.6%b
ASEAN Free Trade Area 1.3%
Australia-New Zealand 0.1%
APEC 23.7%b
TOTAL 61.0%                    
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block with one neighbour. In the next stage the members of one agree-
ment merge with those of another agreement and so on. This process 
continues until global free trade is reached. But will this happen, or 
are there circumstances in which the process will be curtailed? Some 
analysts, for example see Meade (1955), have found that the full proc-
ess is possible, but only if the general level of inter-block tariffs is low 
enough to allow firms to make greater profits with unrestricted access 
to all markets. These two possibilities highlight the importance of hav-
ing rules of accession and on the use of preferential agreements. These 
rules will place a discipline on preferential agreements, constraining 
the process  in a particular direction. In the absence of these rules, the 
block will stop growing short of global free trade. That is, when block 
members are given discretion over who can join, they will stop letting 
in others before global free trade is reached.
Should Regionalism be Given Priority over WTO-based 
Approach?
Although there are inherent problems in the multilateral approach to 
global free trade, the approach by way of regionalism is also fraught 
with inherent costs and dangers.
There is a cost in having a series of bilateral and regional trade agree-
ments in terms of the risk of complex rules of origin. As pointed out by 
Findlay (2001), the more dimensions there are to an agreement, the more 
scope there is to apply discrimination in a variety of ways and the more 
difficult it  is to bolt together the agreements that emerge. The range of 
issues now being considered, such as services, standards and investment, 
add to the dimensions of the agreements. The outcome could be a bowl 
of noodles made up of the criss-crossing of agreements, of different 
content, applying different principles in resolving new issues. The cost 
of doing business could increase due to the inconsistencies between 
the various elements of the agreements, such as different schedules 
for phasing out tariffs, different rules of origin, exclusions, conflicting 
standards and differences in rules in dealing with anti-dumping and 
other regulations and policies. The more dimensions there are to the 
new agreements and the more agreements there are, the wider the scope 
for inconsistencies to emerge. 
Apart from economic costs, there could also be political costs in hav-
ing a series of bilateral trade deals. It has been argued that although 
the US-Singapore FTA could bring some indirect benefits for ASEAN 
103
Free Trade Agreements: WTO and ASEAN Implications 
countries, this bilateral trade pact could also present some risks and 
challenges for ASEAN as a preferential economic grouping. Singapore 
can be perceived by other ASEAN countries as providing a 'back door' 
for non-ASEAN countries to the region and thus as undermining the 
effectiveness of AFTA. Critics have alleged that Singapore's FTA part-
ners will be able to gain tariff-free access into ASEAN markets through 
Singapore, without providing reciprocal access to the ASEAN countries 
(Asiaweek, 8 December 2000). Whether this perception is groundless 
or not, it could undermine Singapore's relationship with its ASEAN 
neighbors. The importance of the ASEAN region to Singapore cannot 
be overemphasized as it provides Singapore a hinterland and a source 
of raw materials and cheap labour. In addition, regional cooperation 
is the key to the resolution of the current political problems afflicting 
Singapore and the region. Singapore is also equally important to the 
ASEAN region economically and politically. The US-Singapore FTA 
must be seen as beneficial to the region and as contributing to the nar-
rowing of the development gaps within ASEAN. 
The multi-dimensional nature of the agreements can also be a source 
of problems if the consequence of the interaction is a set of hubs and 
spokes. Hub and spoke agreements do not provide equal access to all 
participants. Even if tariffs were removed in each spoke, the spoke 
countries would still not have free access to each other's markets. They 
only have access to the hub. The extent of access is also likely to vary 
among spokes. Thus, the benefits to the hub economy are quite obvi-
ous. It gains benefits from the preference it gets in access to the spoke 
economies and in terms of obtaining imports from the other spokes. 
The hub economy can also divert foreign investments from the spokes 
because foreign investors would have access to all the spokes in addi-
tion to the domestic market access of the host economy. The spokes lose 
since they do not gain from free trade with other spokes, they could 
be damaged by discrimination in other spoke markets and they might 
have a reduced ability to compete in all markets against firms based in 
the hub (Wonnacott 1996). 
The growth of hub and spoke mechanisms could lead to a greater 
resistance to multilateral liberalization. It is argued that each spoke 
country has paid a price for its preferential access to the hub country. 
The spokes will resist further reductions of tariffs on an MFN basis which 
erode the value of their special deal on the sensitive products. For the 
same reason the current spokes would also resist the admission of new 
members to the arrangement since the value of their preferential access 
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is diminished. This resistance may come not only from domestic inter-
ests in the spoke countries but also from foreign investors who might 
have invested in a spoke country for the purpose of access to the hub. 
Spokes may also have little say in the process of admission in which case 
the trade policy of the hub becomes a point of potential conflict among 
current and prospective members of the arrangement. 
TABLE 2: A Large Share of Real Income Gains Comes from Lowering 
Barriers in Agriculture and Food
(real income gains in 2015 relative to the baseline 1997 $billion)
Liberalizing region
Low and 
middle-
income coun-
tries
High-in-
come
countries
All 
coun-
tries
Decomposition of static impacts
Gains to low- and middle-income countries
· Agriculture and food
· Manufacturing
· All merchandise trade
80
33
114
20
25
44
101
58
159
Gains to high-income countries
· Agriculture and food
· Manufacturing
· All merchandise trade
23
44
67
64
-3
63
91
41
132
Global gains
· Agriculture and food
· Manufacturing
· All merchandise trade
103
77
181
84
22
107
193
98
291
Decomposition of dynamic impacts
Gains to low- and middle-income countries
· Agriculture and food
· Manufacturing
· All merchandise trade
167
95
265
75
9
85
240
108
349
Gains to high-income countries
· Agriculture and food
· Manufacturing
· All merchandise trade
19
36
55
100
13
115
117
48
169
Global gains
· Agriculture and food
· Manufacturing
· All merchandise trade
185
131
321
174
22
199
358
156
518
Source: World Bank 2004
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The principle of reciprocity, on which RTAs are based, can also place 
the poor developing countries at a disadvantage or at worst get them 
left out of the preferential agreements. The quid pro quo arrangement 
implies that only countries with somewhat similar or closely similar 
levels of economic development will find it less difficult to forge some 
form of economic cooperation or integration. Thus, the principle of non-
discrimination can therefore work in favour of poorer countries.
The formation of new bilateral and regional FTAs is having significant 
effects on the world trading system. In these bilateral FTAs, liberaliza-
tion commitments are incomplete, with implementation sometimes 
open-ended, and important sectors, such as agriculture, often largely 
excluded.5  For example, the Japan-Singapore FTA has set a bad pre-
cedent by excluding some agricultural products from trade liberaliza-
tion; specifically, the Agreement excludes cut flowers and ornamental 
fish, Singapore's principal exports of agricultural products to Japan. It 
has been reported that Japan will push for a similar exclusion in future 
negotiations with countries such as Mexico, Korea and Australia. If such 
deals proliferate, it could become harder to secure multilateral reforms 
in agriculture, thus working against the developing countries, which 
are natural exporters of agricultural goods. 
The World Bank in its Global Economic Prospects, 2004 gives an analysis 
of the potential economic gains that could be achieved with the reduc-
tion of trade barriers in the Doha round. According to this analysis 
(see Table 2), a successful Doha round could generate $291 billion in 
global economic gains.6 Measured in static terms, some $159 billion in 
additional income would be reaped by developing countries in 2015 
and rich countries would gain around $132 billion. The gains, which 
would  raise income levels by 1.5 and 0.5 percent, respectively, for de-
veloping and rich countries, could be much higher if dynamic effects 
– such as an increase in productivity and increasing FDI – are taken into 
consideration. In developing countries, the dynamic gains (totaling $349 
billion) are some 120 percent higher than static gains. The dynamic gain 
(totaling $169 billion) for rich countries is less dramatic, because of the 
low GDP weight of agriculture, for which protection is strongest. The 
reduction of trade barriers in agriculture and food yield a static gain of 
$193 billion (in 2015), two thirds of the total static gains from merchan-
dise trade reform of $291 billion. More than 50 percent of these gains in 
agriculture and food, $101 billion, are reaped by developing countries, 
of which 80 percent is the result of own-reform in these two sectors. In 
other words, reform of agriculture and food in rich countries would 
106 The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 20•2004
Jose L. Tongzon
lead to a gain of some $20 billion for developing countries as a whole. 
Manufacturing liberalization by rich countries would lead to gains of 
$25 billion to developed countries and could potentially even lead to a 
small loss of $3 billion to rich countries as increased market access by 
developing countries generates term-of-trade losses for rich countries. 
Trade would increase sharply particularly in the most severely pro-
tected sectors: agriculture and food. Global merchandise trade would 
increase by about 10 percent (more than $800 billion), but exports from 
developing countries would rise by 20 percent (nearly $540 billion). The 
largest percentage increase in trade (nearly 50 percent) would occur in 
processed foods. Agricultural trade would rise by 32 percent. Develop-
ing countries should see an increase in their exports of textiles, cloth-
ing, and footwear, although its magnitude would depend on the final 
implementation of the Uruguay Round (World Bank 2004).
The number of poor would decline substantially. At the world level, 
the number of persons living on $1/day or less would decline by 61 
million, or 8 percent of the current forecast for 2015 of 734 million. The 
number living on $2/day or less would decline by 144 million. The great-
est reduction in absolute terms would come in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
region's unskilled workers would see the largest percentage increase in 
nominal wages and decreases in the cost of living. 
Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2003) offer another analysis of the po-
tential welfare gains of the trade liberalization which is to be carried out 
in the Doha round. Their analysis estimates that global welfare would 
rise by $684 billion. The United States, EU and EFTA, Japan, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand would have a combined welfare gain of 
$227 billion. The combined welfare gain of the developing and other 
countries would be $457 billion. These estimates differ somewhat from 
those of the World Bank because of the different assumptions and dif-
ferent databases used in the two analyses. 
The above-mentioned analyses indicate the significant potential 
economic gains to the world and to developing countries, in terms of 
income gains, increased trade and poverty reduction, if the Doha round 
had been successful. With the collapse of Cancun, the hope of the Doha 
round being successfully concluded is dim and the potential gains can 
turn out to be a real loss, especially to the developing countries.
Success at bilateral trade deals coupled with a lack of progress on the 
Doha round would gradually create a different kind of global integra-
tion. From an economic perspective, a 'spaghetti bowl' of bilateral trade 
agreements is much less desirable than progress towards multilateral 
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free trade. As has been proved theoretically, multilateral trade liberaliza-
tion has positive and often sizeable impacts on economic welfare in all 
of the industrialized and developing countries/regions. While regional 
and bilateral FTAs may be welfare-enhancing for the member countries 
directly involved, these welfare gains are considerably smaller then 
those resulting from multilateral trade liberalization, and, in any case, 
accrue in absolute terms primarily to the large industrialized countries. 
Thus, the benefits of FTAs to the developing-country partners appear 
somewhat limited. It is also the case that the regional and bilateral FTAs 
involve elements of trade diversion and are therefore detrimental to 
some non-member countries (Brown, Dearndorff and Stearn 2003). 
Developing countries have much to gain from a multilateral trading 
system based on strong rules, both to protect them against pressures 
from more powerful countries and to help them improve their own trade 
and domestic policies. Thus, it is in their vital interest that the rulemaking 
be conducted within the WTO, where their limited leverage in bilateral 
negotiations with larger countries is not an impediment. The trend to-
wards bilateralism and regionalism does not augur well for developing 
countries. Developing countries have much to lose if the Doha round 
were to fail. For the poorest countries in particular, the chances of get-
ting from a bilateral deal with America what they failed to get from the 
Doha round are nil. With their weak economies and weak bargaining 
power in bilateral negotiations, poor countries will have little chance of 
reaching FTAs with the rich countries and major regional groups. Thus 
they will be excluded from major markets.
At Cancun, it was reported that a group of poor countries, most of 
them from Africa, feared that freeing farm trade would mean losing 
their special preferences (The Economist, 18 September 2003). This section 
discusses how well trade preferences are serving developing countries 
and the implications of continuing with the preferences if the Doha 
round is not successfully concluded.
Most favourable and differential treatment of developing countries 
is a prominent feature of multilateral trade rules. Selected subsets of 
developing countries have been granted trade preferences. However, 
the present patchwork system has not worked especially well and trade 
preferences have had a limited impact on the exports of the beneficiary 
countries. Among the reasons, the following are especially important.
Countries benefiting from trade preferences have generally un-
der-performed in exports. One reason is that rich countries granted 
preferences voluntarily rather than as part of a binding multilateral 
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negotiation. Those preferences, often laden with restrictions, product 
exclusions and administrative rules, prevent beneficiaries from taking 
full advantage of them.  For example, only 39 percent of potentially 
preferred imports under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
into the Quad countries (Canada, the EU, Japan, and the United States) 
actually took advantage of preferential access. The usage rates are declin-
ing (World Bank 2004). Besides GSP, the Quad countries also sponsor 
their own 'deep preference' programmes such as the EU's Everything 
But Arms programme and the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity 
Act. However, each has different rules and exceptions. For these reasons, 
preferences cover only a portion of exports from even poor developing 
countries. Even when effective, preferences tend to divert trade away 
from other poor countries.
Existing preferences do relatively little for most of the world's poor-
est people (those living on less than $1 per day), most of whom live in 
China, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Northeast Brazil, and some ASEAN 
countries, which may enjoy only partial preferences at best. Although 
some of these countries enjoy limited preference access to some mar-
kets, all would be better off with across-the-board, non-discriminatory 
binding access under the WTO rules.
The extensive use of voluntary preference schemes has created per-
verse incentives in both rich and poor countries to avoid liberalization 
that would otherwise benefit the poor. Too often, rich countries have 
offered differential treatment to a subset of poor countries instead of 
arriving at MFN reductions in trade barriers that would benefit all de-
veloping countries. Trade preferences have also been used as a defence 
by developed countries against genuine, multilateral liberalization in 
products of potential comparative advantage of developing countries.7 
The preferences discourage liberalization within the beneficiary coun-
tries themselves. The present system of preferences reduces the incentive 
to negotiate effectively for reductions in trade barriers abroad and with 
domestic protectionist constituencies at home. This is either because they 
believe that they will not receive any further concessions in the multi-
lateral process or because of concerns about erosion of preferences.
Because the preference schemes are not under the discipline of the 
WTO and they are offered as privileges, they frequently (a) exclude 
precisely those products in which developing countries have a com-
parative advantage, (b) 'graduate' a country out of the preference for a 
product just as it begins to achieve significant success as an exporter, 
and (c) attach side conditions that amount to reciprocal concessions from 
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developing countries. (The original concept of GSP precludes reciprocal 
concessions from developing countries). These side conditions relating 
to labour, to the environment and  to the grant of  significant preferences 
introduce a certain element of uncertainty for exporters. The benefits 
may be withdrawn any time on the pretext that a specific standard is 
not being fulfilled. This deters potential entrepreneurs from making the 
necessary investments.
To take advantage of a tariff preference, an exporting country must 
satisfy certain 'rules of origin' to substantiate the claim that it indeed 
produced the goods rather than import them from another one excluded 
from GSP privileges. The commonest rule makes the preference con-
tingent on a minimum value addition to the product by the exporting 
countries. This requirement can be a major deterrent since many small 
and poor countries are able to perform only simple assembly operations, 
so that they may not be able to satisfy the rules of origin. In contrast, 
richer and larger developing countries may succeed in satisfying these 
rules and be better able to take advantage of the preference. The rule-
of-origin requirements and related inspection procedures can be quite 
costly. The associated paperwork and administrative requirements are 
likely to be a major reason that many eligible products do not enter 
developed-country markets under the preference provisions. Instead 
exporters pay the applicable MFN tariff.
Most of the academic research on preference programmes (for ex-
ample see Panagariya 2002) has concluded not only that they generally 
yield modest export increases at best, but also that a significant portion 
of these gains is from trade diversion from non-beneficiaries. Therefore it 
is more important than ever to complete the Doha round of negotiations, 
bringing trade barriers down in developed and developing countries on 
a non-discriminatory basis. Such liberalization will not only promote 
genuine free trade but also remove the uncertainty associated with 
one-way trade preferences, reduce the existing discrimination across 
countries and help clean up the spaghetti-bowl phenomenon that now 
characterizes the trading system (Panagariya 2002). Because of the 
weaknesses and ineffectiveness of the preference schemes, they will 
continue to have a little impact on the exports of developing countries 
if the Doha round is not successfully concluded. 
Conclusion
Despite the limitations of the WTO process in achieving global free 
trade, it is still a relevant organization. RTAs should remain a second 
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best policy option. Countries and in particular developing countries of 
ASEAN should remain primarily committed to the ideals and modus 
operandi of the WTO.
In the face of the recent spurt of interest in regionalism, ASEAN coun-
tries should adopt a pragmatic approach. They should continue to place 
the highest priority on the multilateral trading system promoted by 
the WTO, as countries can only prosper if goods and services can flow 
freely with minimum impediments within a rule-based global trading 
framework. At the same time, since countries are closely tied to their 
neighbours, it is in their interest to help promote deeper regional eco-
nomic integration to enhance  competitive strength and attractiveness. 
By meeting the conditions and guiding principles set by the WTO for the 
formation of an RTA, we can also create the conditions for the RTAs to 
accelerate the momentum of trade liberalization further without hurting 
trade positions under the WTO framework. 
Dr. Jose L. Tongzon is Associate Professor of Economics at the Department of 
Economics, National University of Singapore.
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1    Nine years ago, the leaders of 34 countries in the Americas (all of them except Cuba) 
unveiled a bold vision of free trade from Alaska to Argentina. The accord is sup-
posed to be finalized by December 2004. 
2      The Mercusor was created by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in March 
1991. The EU and the Mercusor countries signed a Framework Agreement in 1995 
in preparation for negotiations for trade liberalization based on WTO rules. The two 
regional blocks completed the 10th rounds of bioregional negotiations in June 2003.
3    The phrase 'building or stumbling blocks' is owed to Bhagwati (1991: 77) who refers 
to the expansion of membership as a test of preferential trading arrangements (PTA) 
serving as building blocks for global freeing of trade. He also pointed out that if going 
down the PTA path itself can trigger multilateral negotiations and their successful 
conclusion, that too can be a way in which PTAs may serve as building blocks.
4      For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Bhagwati (1996). 
5    This is because of the nature of preferential agreements which are based on the 
principle of reciprocity, allowing countries more scope for excluding politically 
sensitive industries from liberalization. 
6      The assumption used in this analysis can be found in the World Bank, 2004. 
7      In some cases trade preferences are given to developing countries mainly for politi-
cal reasons.
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